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21. Introduction
Economic development and structural transformation of the transition economies are
dependent upon the extent to which banks function as financial intermediaries, permitting an
efficient separation between savers and investors. The development of commercial banking
in Russia after the 1988 banking reform has been enormous in terms of numbers. In 1995
there were already around 2500 banks registered (Buchs (1999), Warner (1998)). The
benefits of free competition among banks on the savings market in transition economies, a
supposed consequence of a liberal entry policy, are by no means clear. In recent articles
there is a tendency to prefer competition above concentrated and sheltered banking systems
(see e.g. Smith (1998)). Claesens (1998) claims that more liberal entry can bolster the
development of banking systems in transition economies. Gorton and Winton (1998), being
aware of the delicate trade-off between stability and efficiency, argue that some banking
instability may be inevitable to achieve an efficient commercial banking system. However,
there are several reasons to fear that a walk over the 'new entry'-path may be a dangerous
journey.
The development of Russia’s banking sector was regarded as a success until the 1995
liquidity crisis and the 1998 Rouble crisis showed some important instabilities in the financial
system. An important structural reason for these instabilities is that even when the Russian
banking sector was considered unusually successful, no less than four out of five banks
conducted business with dangerously low funding capital, not hindered by enforcement of
reserve requirements (Buchs (1999), section 4.2). Massive entry implies that many banks are
small and not experienced, the asset portefolio is one-sided, management may be
incompetent or it has bad intentions. Many reasons to expect that the probability of bank
failures will increase. Estrin and Wright (1999) show that Russia is performing relatively poor
when it comes to progress in the transition of the financial institutions. They argue that there
is no effective bank supervision and little or no lending by financial institutions to the private
sector. In recent literature that stresses the benefits of competition in the banking sector, the
problem of bank failures is sometimes mentioned, but it is implicitly or explicitly assumed that
it is a short run phenomenon, and that the social costs are insignificant compared with the
virtues of competiton and private ownership.
In the present paper we argue that a liberal entry policy during a period of economic turmoil
provides little benefits in terms of efficiency while contributing to instability. The large majority
of new and small banks fail to achieve a sound market position as they suffer from a liability
of newness: “the new banks will be very risky and prone to failure, not only because of the
risk of their loans, but because private agents such as depositors and established banks will
demand premia if they are to invest in these new banks” (Gorton and Winton, 1998, p.647).
3Our analysis shows that the extent of competition on the deposits market was low despite the
high number of market particpants because new banks face important mobility barriers and
have been no important threat to the large incumbent banks (which were also favoured by
the government). We concentrate on the Moscovian segment of the Russian three months
deposits market during 1994 - 1997. Specifically, we investigate the determinants of the
market shares of the incumbent banks, the impact of the interbank crisis in August 1995, the
determinants of the choice of their strategies and the extent of competition on this market as
measured using a model originally developed by Barros and Modesto (1999).
Economic transition from plan (socialist accumulation) to market (capitalist growth) requires a
well-developed banking sector and an adequate household savings market. There was little
need for households to save in the central planned economy (EBRD (1996)).  Employment
was virtually guaranteed, the state provided social security benefits that eliminated the need
to save for a 'rainy day' or for retirement. Additionally, there was little access to durable
products. Therefore, households are to be expected to save a higher share of their
disposable income in market (capitalist) economic systems than in the former Soviet system.
Table 1 shows the share of savings in total disposable income.1 During the period 1993-1997
this share was about one quarter. In 1998 there was the ‘Rouble crisis’ and the saving rate
dropped quite strongly. The share of deposits and securities in total household savings has
been steadily decreasing since 1993. Households could put their savings in three categories:
deposits and securities, hard currency in banks and cash money. The decline in the share of
deposits and securities in the total household savings has been due to a strong increase in
the share of hard currency in banks. That is, we establish that only a small and diminishing
part of household savings has become available for funding business investments or
government expenditures.2 The majority of savings is kept in cash (Roubles) or hard
currencies.
In our study of the performance and dynamics of the Russian deposits market, we will use a
(quarterly) data set acquired by the ACE-project group 'Role of information on Russian
individuals' savings market' (Avdasheva, 1998). The data describe the period of the first
quarter of 1994 till the second quarter of 1997. Many banks entered and also many left the
savings market during that period. In the beginning of the period under investigation inflation
was extremely high, because the Russian government was creating money to resolve budget
deficits. The main task of the banking sector in this time was the transfer of the so-called
                                                                
1 Gregory et al. (1999) doubt whether the household savings have been as high as reported in the official
statistics which have been used for the table. Using survey data they argue that the total household savings rate
has been much lower. Because they find that the official data for the deposits and securities category are much
more in line with the survey results, the share of deposits and securities in the total household savings rate is
thought to be much higher.
4'centralized credit' from the government to state enterprises and other public institutions. In
August 1995 the Russian interbank loans market collapsed in a web of non-payments. In
reaction to the financial crisis the government tightened its monetary policy successfully. The
raging inflation process stopped and consequently the profit opportunities of the commercial
banks disappeared, because the stream of centralized credit dried out and the banks could
no longer earn inflation rents (Schleifer and Treisman (1998), p.44). The role of the banks
changed drastically; in stead of transferring subsidies, they had to finance the necessary
expenditures by the Russian government. For this reason the household savings market
became an important financial source, not so much for private investment, but for state
expenditures. The banks were inclined to attract household savings, because the
government offered them relative high interest rates for short-term state securities on the
GKO-market. The average profitability of banks, which was huge, went down as a result of
the change in government policy, but still remained high (Warner (1998)). In this context a
small group of banks was privileged, because only they were allowed to enter the primary
GKO-market. Also the position of Sberbank (State Savingsbank) was strengthenend: it
became the official dealer in GKOs for the Central Bank of Russia, and also the Ministry of
Finance payment agent for coupon dividends and bond redemption.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the multinomial logit
market share model which we use to determine the extent of market dynamics. Section 3 is
used for a description of the data set and for a discussion of the results of a survey on saving
behaviour. In Section 4 we present the empirical results for the market share model. This is
followed in Section 5 by an investigation into the strategies used by the saving banks during
the 1994-1997 period. In Section 6 we develop and estimate the Barros and Modesto model
to measure the extent of competition on the Moscovian deposits market. Section 7
concludes.
2. The multinomial logit market share model
Market shares of firms have two basic properties: they are positive and they add up to unity.
A well-known model satisfying these conditions is the multinomial logit market share model.
The model can be derived as follows. Consumers choose between n competing products
(banks). The products differ in their attractiveness to them. The utilities of holding deposits at
each of the n banks are assumed to be random variables which have a joint multivariate
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
2 Warner (1998) reports that Russian banks had a very small share of interest-bearing deposits when compared
to U.S. banks. For a sample of Moscow banks the average percentage of those depostis was a mere 2% of
assets compared to 49% on average for the U.S. commercial banks.
5extreme-value distribution.3 This assumption allows to derive a simple relation between the
probability of choosing a certain bank and the values of attraction of the n banks in the
Moscow deposits market.
Denote by iU  the random utility of holding deposits at bank i. The probability that saving
bank i is chosen is then equal to ],...,1[ njUUP ji =³ . We assume that ),...,( 1 nUU has a n-
variate extreme value distribution of the form:
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We do not observe individual choices but we have available the aggregate outcome of all the
individual choices: the market shares. If we denote by itA  the value of ‘attraction’ of product i
in period t, then the market share of product i is assumed to equal:
(3) 
å
=
= n
j
jt
it
it
A
A
s
1
The value of ‘attraction’ is assumed to be determined by K predetermined variables, xkit, as
follows:
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One may derive from equations (3) and (4) that the effect of the predetermined variables on
the market shares equals:
                                                                
3 Fishburn (1998) argues that “The most common locus of randomness for stochastic utility may be preference
comparisons between complex objects that are difficult to compare because of multiple attributes, environmental
uncertainties, and incomplete specification.” (p.276).
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Cooper and Nakanishi (1988) show that the effects of the predetermined variables on
attractiveness can be estimated from the following model:
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where ud  are time dummies for each of the periods 1 through T and ite  is an error term.
Consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (6) can be achieved by applying ordinary
least squares. The predetermined variables in our multinomial logit market share model are
of three kinds. The first are variables that differ across products but are constant over time.
The second are lagged values of variables that are actively chosen by firms, such as
advertising and the price level. The third is log(si,t-1), the lagged value of the endogenous
variable. This variable is included to correct for and to measure consumer loyalty.
3. Data and results of a survey of saving behaviour
We have data available of each Moscow-based bank ‘active’ on the three months deposits
market. The bank was defined to be ‘active’ when (i) it had got a licence from the Russian
central bank to offer saving accounts for three months deposits and when (ii) it had
advertised at least once in a Moscow newpaper. For the period 1994-1997 about 70% of the
expenses for sales promotion was allocated to advertising in newspapers. We have quarterly
data available from the first quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 1997. In the empirical
analysis we incorporate only those banks that reported the amount of personal deposits. The
entry date is taken to be the first time that the bank reported deposits (and had advertised). It
is equal to or later than the licency date.
The variables in the data set consist of (i) quarterly interest rates, personal deposits, licency
dates and sizes of total assets of the official banks, derived from Finansovije Izvestia and
Commersant rating, based on information of the Central Bank of Russia; (ii) advertising
outlays of Moscovian banks collected by the consulting agency NEX-SV in Moscow.
A summary of the market share data for the Moscovian three months deposits market is
given in Table 2. Over the period 1994.I (the first quarter of 1994) to 1997.II (the second
quarter of 1997) we see a rise in the number of saving banks, reporting deposits data, up to
756 followed by a decline to 30. The majority of the banks is small, but at the end of the
observation period eight saving banks had market shares above 5%. The maximum market
share has been below 20% for most of the quarters. A clear exception is the first quarter
(1994.I) during which the Sber-bank still had a share of about one third of the three months
deposits market. The Herfindahl Index is also at its maximum in period 1994.I and equals
0.153. This concentration index decreased up to 0.049 in quarter 1995.II and rose again
steadily after the August 1995 crisis to 0.080 in quarter 1997.II. 4 In the last two columns of
Table 2 we show the number of firms, and their average market shares, for which the data
necessary for the multinomial logit estimation procedure are available. The percentage of
firms for which these data are available has increased over time.
During the period of investigation the deposits interest rate has, on average, declined. In
Table 3 the average, minimum and maximum interest rates offered by the banks are given
for the period which we use in our analysis. Since mid 1995 up till mid 1997 the average
interest rate has declined quite strongly. The standard deviation of the interest rates has
declined as well, with the standard deviation in 1997.II being only one fifth of that in 1995.II.
Therefore, the absolute difference between the interest rates of the market participants has
diminished. The relative difference has remained quite constant, though. Table 3 shows that
the coefficient of variation had a maximum of 0.15 in early 1996 and a minimum of 0.09 both
in late 1995 and in 1997.II. The ratio of the maximum to the minimum interest rate was
between 1.5 and 2.0 in each of the quarters. In the last column of Table 3 the correlation
between the interest rate offered and the market share of the bank is given. In the period
1994.III till 1996.I there was a clear negative correlation: banks with small market shares
offered relatively high interest rates. Since 1996.II the interest rate and market share have
been largely uncorrelated. This indicates that either (i) small banks offering relatively high
rates have exited or that (ii) small banks have become more cautious in using a risky high
interest strategy or that (iii) large banks have been more eager to use the savings market as
financial source and started to offer higher rates.
Some important decision criteria for Russian households to choose a bank are closely
related to its size. ‘Large’ banks usually have a lower probability of bankruptcy,5 offer a wider
package of services and have a larger network of local offices. A common measure of the
total size of a bank is the total amount of assets. We have available information on the total
amount of assets for most banks and for these banks for most of the quarters. However, the
                                                                
4 Russia has a relatively low concentration of bank market power when compared to other transition economies.
See for example Table 2 in Gorton and Winton (1998, p.627).
5 In Table 37 of the Statistical Addendum to the 1997 annual report of the Bank of Russia, banks were ranked
according to their financial condition on May, 1st 1997. Out of 2,594 banks there were 706 (27%) whose licence
was revoked. Their total assets amounted to 8% of the total assets in banks. Additionally, there were 540 banks
(21%) which were in critical financial condition. Their total assets equaled 5% of the total assets in banks. These
figures show that mostly small banks encountered financial problems (at least before the 1998 Rouble crisis).
8assets variable poses some difficulties of interpretation. First, it is often unclear what assets
are incorporated and what assets are not. Second, there is an important problem of asset
valuation. There have been high default rates on loans. In fact, some banks starting to
default on repayment of their loans started off the August 1995 crisis. Third, for some banks
data on assets are not available for all quarters. However, from data available for other
quarters we can deduct that they are relatively large or small.
We decided to divide the saving banks into two categories: one of banks with a relatively
large amount of total assets and one with banks with a relatively small amount of total
assets. It should be noted that the three months deposits market consitutes only a small part
of the total assets of the banks. For example, the Sberbank was by far the largest bank in
terms of assets while its market share in the Moscow three months deposits market was
relatively small. In Table 4 we show the 11 saving banks which had total assets in the top 8
in at least 3 out of the 14 quarters. These banks are in the category of ‘large‘ banks and none
exited during the period under investigation. Most of them had relatively high shares in the
deposits market with the exception of the Imperial Bank. In 1997.II the total share of the 11
TOP8 saving banks was equal to 77%.6
Early 1998 the Centre of Public Opinion Investigation (a professional survey agency, in
Russia known as VCIOM) performed a survey in Moscow for the ACE-project 'Role of
information on Russian individuals' savings market'. The total number of respondents was
1424 with 865 of them (61%) in fact having any savings. From the respondents with savings,
53% had their savings in cash money, 43% had their savings in the Sberbank and 18% had
their savings in other banks (note that these figures do not add to 100% as respondents may
have chosen more than one category).7 The respondents were asked to rate the importance
of seven criteria of bank attractiveness on a scale from 0 (not important) to 5 (very
important). The average scores of respondents with savings for the seven criteria can be
found in Table 5.
Two criteria in the survey were considered to be of high importance to the respondents. The
reputation of the bank was mentioned as the most important criterion of attractiveness, on
average, followed by the interest rate offered by the bank. Advertising was considered as
relatively unimportant, but this does not necessarily imply that choice is barely affected by
advertsing. It is not unusual for respondents to underestimate the impact of advertising on
                                                                
6 The dependence of a bank on the Moscovian three months deposits market – in terms of the ratio of deposits
over total assets – is at its maximum for the two smallest (in terms of assets) banks in 1997.II. These two banks
are the Optimum-Bank (ratio is 23.3%) and the LEFKO-Bank (ratio is 20.8%). The bank with the highest market
share (Incombank) had a ratio of 6.6%.
7 Note that the 1998 survey sample appears to have disproportionaly many people with savings in the Sberbank
when compared to the market share of this bank in the three-months deposits market (1994-1997). This is for
some part caused by the people with high savings amounts (people with high income level, like entrepreneurs
and managers) who have a relatively high propensity to have savings in other banks but make up only a small
percentage of the sample.
9their consumer decisions. Respondents with their savings (only) in private banks rank 'scope
of services' and 'annual balance sheet' as important criteria. The latter suggests that many
Russians did not behave naïvely when depositing their savings in a commercial bank. The
last column of the table shows that clients of private banks tend to attach a higher value – on
average - on the criteria of attractiveness. This suggests that clients of private banks are
more conciously seeking for the most adequate bank given their preferences.
The questionnaire provides useful information about the public perception of factors of
attractiveness of saving banks but it leaves at least one important question unanswered. This
question is how the decision to choose a bank is determined on the basis of the factors of
attractiveness. For example, if a respondent has highly valued both “Reputation” and
“Interest Rate”, does this then mean that he or she is indifferent between a firm with high
reputation but low interest rates, a firm with medium reputation and medium interest rates
and a firm with low reputation but high interest rates? This is the case when the decision to
choose a bank is determined by a linear function of the various criteria. However, it may also
be the case that the respondent prefers that bank offering the highest interest rate among a
group of banks with high reputation. That is, the high average valuation of “Reputation” could
imply that banks with low reputation are removed by many people from their choice set. In
the next section we find empirical evidence for this interpretation.
4. Empirical results for the market share equation
Regression results for equation (6) are presented in Table 6. The determinants of market
share that we consider are the interest rate offered (INT), the assets size of the bank (the
dummy variable TOP8), the advertsing expenses (A) in the previous quarter(s) and the
market share in the previous period. In total there are 469 observations available. For these
observations the mean and standard deviation of market share are 0.024 and 0.033,
respectively. The dependent variable in equation (6) is the logarithm of market share
(LNSHARE).8 The mean and standard deviation of this variable are –4.560 and 1.346,
respectively. The mean of the interest rate variable, INT, equals 0.727 with a standard
deviation of 0.241. The mean and standard deviation of the lagged advertising dollar amount,
A(-1), are 72.6 and 103.8, respectively. We did not find any effect of the licency date and did
not include it in this analysis.
We have also considered whether the effects were different before and after the August 1995
crisis. We found strong evidence for the lagged market share variable to have a very different
                                                                
8 Whereas the market share data are highly non-normally distributed, the hypothesis of normality of the logarithm
of market shares cannot be rejected. The Jarque-Bera P2(2)-test on normality is 1323.27 (p-value 0.000) for the
market shares case and 4.45 (p-value 0.108) for the logarithm of market shares case.
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effect before and after the crisis, but failed to find evidence for that for any of the other
variables. We have chosen each of the predetermined variable in a logarithmic form as well.
The results can be summarized as follows. Interest rate has no influence on market share
except when the bank has a high amount of assets (the cross effect LN(1+INT)*TOP8 is
significant). Savers seem not to be attracted to banks which offer high rates but are small
and, hence, risky. Among the ‘large’ banks, interest rate is an important criterion used by
Moscovian savers to choose a bank. Advertising in the previous quarter(s) has a significant
effect on market share. That is, despite the results of the questionnaire in which Moscovian
savers rank advertising low on the list of criteria of attractiveness, advertising appears to
affect them in their choice behavior. We return to the specific lag structure of the effect of
advertising after the next paragraph.
The results indicate that before the 1995 crisis a bank could count on 85% - on average - of
the deposits market share of the previous quarter to be attracted irrespective of interest rates
and advertising. After the crisis this percentage increases up to 94%. Therefore, the extent of
market dynamics has decreased after the crisis. Small and young firms appeared to have
been able to gain market share relatively easy before the crisis. After the crisis this was
much more difficult and a considerable consolidation in the banking sector took place.
In order to evaluate the lag structure of the effect of advertising we present the effects of
advertising lagged from 0 to 4 quarters. The results are presented in Table 7. Current
advertising does not have a significant (immediate) effect on the market share. This is a
consequence of deposits being measured at the beginning of the period while the amount of
advertising is spent during the entire period. Advertising lagged one and two quarters both
have a (similar) significant effect. According to the table the advertising effect has faded out
in the third quarter as there appears to be no effect of advertising lagged three or more
quarters. This confirms our choice for the lag structure in Table 6.
Observations can only be taken into consideration in the regression analysis of the first
column of Table 6 if they have a positive market share both in the current and in the previous
quarter. This requirement implies that entrants in the current quarter are omitted from the
analysis because they do not have a positive market share in the previous quarter. Firms
which were in the sample in the previous quarter but which have exited in the current quarter
are also omitted as they do not a positive current market share. The omission of the entering
and exiting firms is likely to bias the results. In particular, we expect that market share
dynamics will be underestimated when these firms are not included. To test for this we
assumed that an entering firm had a market share in the previous quarter of 0.001 and that
an firm which exits in the current quarter also gets a market share of 0.001. Only 5% of the
observed market shares in our sample (24 out of 469) have a market share which is less
11
than 0.001. Therefore, we assign entrants to have been quite small before they entered and
we assign exiting firms to become quite small.
In the last three columns of Table 6 we present the results of the effects of including entrants
and exiting firms on market share dynamics. The effect of interest and advertising are not
accounted for as data are not available for firms that exit (interest rate) or enter (lagged
advertising). In total there are 45 extra observations concerning exits and 27 extra
observations concerning entrants.9 When entrants and exiting banks are included we find
that consumer loyalty becomes much lower in the period before the crisis but that it is only
slightly lower in the postcrisis period. Therefore, the finding that market share dynamics have
decreased after the August 1995 crisis is affirmed by also considering entry and exit. The last
two columns of Table 6 also show the results when next to incumbent firms only exiting firms
or only entrants are incorporated. The effects are for both cases in between that for the base
case with no entry and exit and the case of both entry and exit included.
5. Saving bank strategies
Considering the two marketing instruments of interest rate offered and marketing expenses
one may divide the saving bank strategies into four categories. The first strategy is a strategy
of offering high interest rates and having high marketing expenditures. This strategy may be
especially attractive for entrants with adequate financial resources like ‘large’ banks which
had not yet diversified into the three months deposits savings market. Because of the small
market shares they do not suffer much from lower margins. The second strategy is a
combination of offering low interest rates and having high marketing expenditures.
Incumbents with high market shares and adequate financial resources may opt for this
strategy. They maintain their market shares by advertising a lot while they do not suffer a
decrease of the margins on their deposits. The third strategy consists of offering high interest
rates and spending relatively low amounts on advertising. This strategy may the only viable
option for small and entering saving banks with no adequate financial resources. Their lack
of financial resources does not allow them to invest much (in advertising) before they start to
make profits. The final strategy is one of inaction. Banks which offer low interest rates and
spend low amounts on advertising appear to (temporarily) have no intention to improve their
market position. In Figure 1 we show a tree diagram of the choices saving banks make with
regard to their possible strategies.
                                                                
9 Three of the exits take place in 1994.III so this would imply that the total net exit over the 1994.III-1997.II period
is 42 minus 27 is 25. This figure is one more than the difference between the number of banks in 1994.III (54) and
that in 1997.II (30) found in Table 1. It has to do with data requirements on including incumbent banks in the
analysis.
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[Figure 1 about here]
In Table 8 our sample of saving banks in the 1994-1997 period for which interest rates and
advertising expenses are available, is split into the four categories of strategy. The two
criteria for splitting the sample of 570 observations of banks are defined as follows: ‘High
interest rate’ implies that the interest rate is above average for that quarter, while ‘Low
interest rate’ implies that it is below average. ‘High advertising’ implies that advertising
expenses are above the median advertising expenses for the total period (which is 33), while
‘Low advertising’ implies that they are below this median.
The average probability of a bank being a TOP8 bank is 22.8% for the entire sample and the
average licency date is 92.5 (the third quarter of 1992). The table shows that young
organizations with little financial resources dominate the strategy characterized by offering
high interest rates and having low advertising expenses. Our market share analysis has
shown that this strategy has not been very successful. The category of banks with low
interest rates and high advertising expenditures contains relatively old and large firms. One
measure of the success of the different strategies is to consider what strategies the exiting
banks have been using in the period before. In Table 9 we summarize the proportions of
exits classified to the last (observed) strategy they used. No less than 60% of all exits used
the High Interest Rate, Low Advertising Strategy. The results do not imply that banks
choosing this strategy made the wrong choice per se, as they often were not left another
choice than using it.
6. Was there competition on the Moscovian deposits market?
Our analysis has shown that there have been important barriers to mobility on the deposits
market. We now turn to the question of the extent of competition on the Moscovian three
months deposits market. For this we apply the recently developed oligopoly model by Barros
and Modesto (1999). In this model banks compete on interest rates for deposits. Barros and
Modesto assume a Dixit-type utility function for the representative consumer.10 This
corresponds to the consumer’s utility U being a function of deposits held at the n banks
(d1,…,dn) and the income spent on outside goods Y. The level of the income spent on outside
goods is equal to the sum of exogenous income y and interest received:
(7) å
=
+=
n
i
iidryY
1
                                                                
10 Given the Portuguese situation Barros and Modesto investigate the public bank as a vehicle for the government
to regulate the market. This is not a relevant issue for the Russian savings market.
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where ri is the interest rate offered by bank i. The consumer’s utility is assumed equal to:
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The bank specific parameter "i stands for the attractiveness of holding deposits at the
specific bank i. This attractiveness may be a function of credibility, the number of branches,
etc. The ratio 1/0 <£ bg  is a measure of substitutability between each bank and all of the
competing banks. In case g  equals zero there is no substitutability and the demand for
holding deposits at a bank does not depend upon the attractiveness and the interest rate of
any of the other n-1 banks.
The amount of deposits held by a utility maximizing consumer at each of the n banks equals:
(9) 
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Banks are assumed to compete on interest rates for deposits. They consider their (future)
attractiveness "i to consumers not to be affected by these rates. This does of course not
preclude the (future) attractiveness of a bank being affected by strategic choices on other
variables, like advertising. Banks maximize their profits B i on their deposits accounts:
(10) niFdrR iiiii ,...,1)( =--=p
where Ri is the rate of return of investments pursued with the deposits confided by
consumers to the bank. This return may be different for banks depending for example upon
their access to the GKO market. The first order condition of profit maximization gives the
following best reply functions:
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If we sum across all banks we find that:
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From equation (12) it is easy to derive that we expect the average deposit interest rate to be
less than half the average rate of return on investment in case there is no substitutability
( 0=g ). In case of perfect substitutability ( 1/ =bg ) and a high number of market
participants n, we expect the average deposit rate to be close to the average rate of return
on investment. A first test of the extent of competition, therefore, is to compare the average
rate of return on investment and the average deposit interest rate.
By introducing { }gbgq )n(/)n( 2
2
1
-+=  equation (11) may be rewritten as:
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That is, the interest offered by bank i depends upon four factors: the number of banks n, the
rate of return Ri, their own attractiveness "i and the interest rates of the competitors. An
important issue in the application of the oligopoly model is to determine which banks are in
the market. We consider banks ‘active’ on the market in case (i) they had a positive market
share in the previous quarter; (ii) they reported deposit and interest rate data; (iii) they had
advertised at least once in a Moscow newspaper. The number is presented in the fourth
column of Table 11.
In Section 3 we discussed several reasons apart from the interest rates offered why some
banks may be more attractive to consumers than others. Banks may derive their
attractiveness from having a large network of branches, from having a wide assortment of
banking activities, from having a good image or from being perceived as credible. Credibility
was a key factor for Russian consumers deciding where to hold their deposits. The
probability of banks going bankrupt during the mid 1990s was very high when compared to
their counterparts in the highly developed capitalist economies. Bankruptcy was not confined
to banks with small market shares on the deposits market. Major players like National Credit
and Tveruniversalbank, for example, lost their licencies in 1996.
We distinguish four variables determining the attractiveness of Russian deposits banks: (i)
the total amount of assets (using the TOP8-dummy); (ii) the date of licensing (using the
licency class variable LIC)11; (iii) the share of the deposits market and (iv) the amount of
                                                                
11 The licency class (value of LIC) is 1 in case the licency date was before the year 1992. A firm is classified to be
in licency class 2, 3 and 4 when the licency dates were in the years 1992, 1993 or 1994 and later.
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advertising (using ln(1+A(-1)))12. The first two variables are very much related to the factor of
credibility. Generally old banks with high amounts of assets are less likely expected to go
bankrupt. The third variable is related to various factors like the extent of network of
branches and the degree of familiarity to consumers. The fourth variable of advertising is a
strategic variable. When banks advertise a lot, they gain attention of consumers and become
part of the choice set. Advertising might also enhance credibility. Sales promotion is
essentially a sunk cost. Apparently the bank has the intention to settle down and may give
information assuring the public that the organization is solid. The household therefore may
not expect that a bank actively engaged in advertising wil run in financial troubles. However,
it is doubtful whether this expectancy was confirmed during the mid 1990s in Russia.
As a measure of the rate of return Ri we take the GKO yield on the secondary market. GKOs
are federal treasury bills with a 3 to 6 months maturity, issued by the Ministry of Finance of
the Russian Federation. The GKO market became increasingly important during the years
1995 and 1996.13 In Table 10 we show the average deposit interest rates and the GKO yield
(in the previous quarter). Up till the 1995 liquidity crisis the yield was high and unstable. After
the successful tightening of the monetary policy the yield delined strongly. In addition to the
GKO yield the percentage change of the consumer price index (CPI) and the percentage
change in the exchange rate versus the US dollar (EXR) are given in Table 10.
From Table 10 it is clear that the GKO yield on the secondary market has always been
higher than the average deposit interest rate. In five out of 13 quarters the GKO yield was
even more than twice as high as the average deposit interest rate.14 These quarters are also
the quarters with the highest GKO yields in the period under investigation. Some preliminary
conclusions from the table are that (i) the extent of competition seems to have been low and
not constant over time and (ii) the extent of competition is negatively related to economic
stability (in terms of GKO-yield, inflation and exchange rates).
The attractiveness of a saving bank is determined by the four factors discussed. If we denote
the jth factor for bank i in period t by ijtx  we have that å ==
4
1j ijtjit
xwa . The equation to be
estimated is:
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12 We did not include advertsing two quarters lagged, A(-2), in the logarithmic expression to benefit from an
additional quarter of information on the extent of competition. Results with A(-2) included are hardly different from
the ones presented in Tables 11 and 12.
13 The total GKO and OFZ nominal outstanding in billion Roubels in January of the years 1994 through 1998 was
285; 15,314; 79,997; 248,449; and 390,890, respectively (source: Russian Economic Trends (RET) of the
Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics and East European Economies (SITE)).
14 Warner (1998, Table 5) reports even higher spreads between lending rates and deposit rates. He concludes
that the declining level of inflation is the explanation for the decline in bank profits.
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Given the estimate of tq  the implied value of tt / bg  equals [ ])n(ˆ./ˆ ttt 250 --qq .
The estimation results of equation (14) are given in two tables. In Table 11 we present the
estimated of tq  and the implied value of tt / bg . In Table 12 we present the estimates of jw ,
i.e. the effects of the determinants of the attractiveness of a saving bank. Table 11 shows
that the estimates of tq  are far from constant over time. In quite some cases the estimate is
even negative. Only at the beginning and at the end of the sample period the estimates are
relatively constant over time. Barros and Modesto (1999)’s results give that bg /  was 0.17
for the Portuguese banking sector (the number of commercial banks equalling seventeen).
On average the extent of competition in Moscow was estimated to be lower although in the
first two quarters of 1997 it is of a comparable magnitude. That is, in a period of increased
stability the extent of competition in Moscovian and Portuguese banking may not be that
different. In periods of large instability as in 1995 in Russia the extent of competition appears
to be hard to measure using standard theories as developed by Barros and Modesto.
There are several reasons to expect that the extent of competition depends upon the degree
to which the market is transparant and stable. We expect that there is less price compettion
in a market which is not transparant and/or which is unstable. During the period 1994-1997
the Russian capital markets went through periods of high and low uncertainty, inflation and
interest rates. Useful indicators of the extent of instability and uncertainty are the GKO-yield,
change in the consumer price index and in the exchange rate.15 The correlation coefficient
between the implied tt / bg  and the GKO-yield is –0.70. For the change in the price index
(CPI) it is –0.35 and for the change in the exchange rate (EXR) it is –0.57.
The results can be summarized as follows. The measured intensity of competition is less
than the competitive strength Barros and Modesto reported for the Portuguese savings
market. We find evidence of the extent of price competition to vary with the economic tide.
During periods of economic turmoil – either through quickly changing prices or exchange
rates – competition seems to be much lower than during periods of relative stability. The
empirical evidence for economic stability to be a precondition for a competitive saving market
has important consequences. It indicates that the emergence of a competitive banking
system may only occur after stable economic relations have been assured. Or, a fast
process of privatization of the banking sector and an introduction of competition by keeping
                                                                
15 The interpretation of this result of our analysis is connected with the question why the GKO-yield was
fluctuating. If it reflects the economic tide, in which periods of economic turmoil are alternated by relatively stable
ones, then it is clear enough that economic stability is a precondition for competition. However we have to keep in
mind, that the primary GKO-market was (and is) a monopsony. The changes in the GKO-yield may be an
indication of the market power of the state.
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entry barriers low may not be the adequate first steps in the transformation process from a
communist to a capitalist economic system.
7. Conclusion
There have been two distinct approaches to the reform of the financial institutions in
transition economies, characterized by Claessens (1998) as 'rehabilitation' and ‘new entry’.
In countries in which the first approach is chosen, for instance in Poland, a high share of
household deposits still remains in the state savings banks during transition. In the Russian
Federation a different approach was chosen: the 'new entry'-path. The break-up of the
Soviet-Union and the split up and privitization of the Gosbank created an environment in
which many de-novo banks could be founded. The Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank
of Russia did not interfere in the more or less spontaneous privatization process and did not
create barriers to entry, because they aimed to achieve a competitive banking sector as
quickly as possible.
The main problem with the many small banks entering the Russian saving market has been
the inability to choose any other strategy than the high risk strategy of offering high interest
rates. This strategy did seldom lead to increase in market share, but it did lead to relatively
risky investment strategies. As a result many of these banks were highly vulnerable to
changing economic circumstances. Large incumbent banks offered lower interest rates but
used advertisements to attract customers. They were able to make high profits, especially
when able to profit from the GKO market. Small banks provided little threat to the large banks
and – despite the high number of firms – competition was low. The estimates of the Barros
and Modesto model show that in some quarters the degree of competition was so low that it
could not be estimated.
During the interbank-crisis a lot of the small banks defaulted and for the remaining ones the
market situation detoriated. Potential depositors became aware of the risks of bank failure
and the vulnerability of small banks in this respect. The consequence of the relatively high
hazard rate became expressed in a high 'lemon'-premium asked by saving households, if
they were contemplating to deposit their savings in a new or a small bank.
Our conclusion is, that the Russian 'new-entry' approach has partly failed, because the
accompanying instability of (small and young) banks going bankrupt has had serious effects
for the Russian bank sector and the savers’ confidence. Also Russian policy has changed in
reaction to events in the banking sector. Influenced by Western advisors the Russian
government articulated the concentration tendency. The requirements for banking licences
were raised and big banks were offered the privilege to enter the primary GKO-market, which
was not only sheltered from outsiders, but also from foreign competitors. For this reason the
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group could make huge profits, but exclusively on state securities with very short maturities.
Russia could not return to the 'rehabilitation-route', but for the time being it has clearly
chosen for stability. However, in the long run it can not be efficient, that attractive loans to the
government are pushing aside investment opportunities in business.
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Table 1. Household savings in Russia (1992 - 1998)
Saving categories in  % Year
of disposable income 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Deposits and securities  5.2  6.7  6.9  5.2  5.3  2.4  1.2
Household savings 20.1 25.4 28.5 24.4 26.7 26.9 16.4
Source: Russian Economic Trends (1999)
Table 2: Market share data for the 14 quarters
Quarter N Ns>0.5% Ns>5% Smax Smean Nused Smean,used
94.I 39 22  3 33.0 2.56 x x
94.II 47 25  6 18.5 2.13 x x
94.III 54 37  6 18.0 1.85 35 2.27
94.IV 56 35  5 22.9 1.79 41 1.85
95.I 55 36  7 11.8 1.82 45 1.86
95.II 56 40  5 12.6 1.79 49 1.99
95.III 53 33  4 15.9 1.89 49 2.01
95.IV 48 34  4 14.6 2.08 45 2.18
96.I 48 31  4 15.4 2.08 43 2.25
96.II 45 27  7 16.3 2.22 41 2.41
96.III 39 27  7 13.4 2.56 34 2.88
96.IV 36 26  8 12.2 2.78 29 3.31
97.I 31 24  8 13.4 3.23 28 3.42
97.II 30 23  8 14.4 3.33 30 3.33
Note: N is the total number of firms. Ns>0.5% is the number of firms with more than 0.5% market share. Ns>5% is the
number of firms with more than 5% market share. Smax is the maximum market share in the period. Smean is the
average market share (1/N). Nused is the number of firms for which all data for the multinomial logit estimation
procedure are available. Smean,used is the average market share of these firms.
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Table 3: Interest rate data for the 12 quarters used in the market share analysis
Quarter INTmean INTmin INTmax INTstd INTcv corr(INT,S)
94.III  83  55  98 11.2 0.135 -0.27
94.IV  65  45  75  8.1 0.125 -0.31
95.I  84  60 100 10.5 0.125 -0.39
95.II 111  80 130 12.3 0.111 -0.37
95.III  96  70 112  9.0 0.094 -0.30
95.IV  78  60  88  7.3 0.094 -0.36
96.I  74  45  91 10.9 0.147 -0.32
96.II  65  45  80  9.6 0.148 -0.09
96.III  62  45  72  6.0 0.097  0.06
96.IV  50  34  60  6.1 0.122 -0.08
97.I  36  20  39  3.8 0.106  0.19
97.II  25  18  28  2.3 0.092 -0.06
Note: INTmean is the average interest rate of firms for which all data for the estimation procedure are available.
INTmin and INTmax are the minimum and maximum interest rate offered. INTstd is the standard deviation of the
interest rate and INTcv is the coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation over mean). The column of
corr(INT,S) gives the correlation coefficient between the interest rate and the market share of firms.
Table 4: The firms in the assets TOP8
name # quarters share share
in TOP8 95.IV 97.II
Incombank 14 14.6 14.4
Russian Credit 14  7.6  3.7
Alfa-Bank 10  2.0  6.3
Stolichniy Saving Bank 14  4.1  8.3
Sber Bank RF 14  4.7 12.2
Imperial Bank  4  0.7  1.0
Avtobank  3  3.4  7.1
Menatep-Bank 11  3.0  3.6
Unicombank  4  2.2  3.0
East-West Bank 10 12.5  9.3
Promstroybank  8  4.7  7.9
Note: The firms have been in the top 8 of firms with highest assets at least during three out of 14 quarters. The
Moscow three months deposits market shares for the fourth quarter of 1995 and the second quarter of 1997 are
given in the last two columns.
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Table 5: Average valuation of seven criteria of attractiveness in VCIOM-survey
Deviation of mean for savings only in
Categories Mean Cash Sberbank Private bank
Reputation 4.35 -0.27  0.12  0.23
Interest Rate 3.98 -0.29  0.13  0.41
Scope of Services 2.77 -0.14 -0.43  0.81
Advises of Friends 2.74  0.17 -0.30  0.47
Location 2.44 -0.29  0.49  0.01
Annual Balance Sheet 2.04 -0.17 -0.26  0.89
Advertising 1.47  0.05 -0.13  0.39
Average 2.83 -0.13 -0.05  0.46
Note: Total number of respondents with savings was equal to 865. The number of respondents with their savings
only in cash were 374, those with their savings only in the Sberbank were 272 and those with their savings only in
private banks were 118. The range of valuation given by the respondents for the categories was 0 (not important)
to 5 (very important). Source: Yakovlev (1998), p.115, in Avdasheva (1998).
Table 6: Estimation results for the market share equation of LNSHARE
Variable Only Incumb. Only Incumb. Ent+Ext Incl. Ext Incl. Ent Incl.
LN(1+INT) -0.139
(0.406)
LN(1+INT)*TOP8  0.257**
(0.113)
LN(1+A(-1)+A(-2))  0.037**
(0.019)
LNSHARE(-1)  0.848***  0.887***  0.732***  0.817***  0.790***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025)
LNSHARE(-1)*PC  0.088***  0.095***  0.224***  0.166***  0.164***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.030) (0.048) (0.038)
R2  0.911  0.908  0.684  0.746  0.822
N  469  469  541  514  496
Note: *,** and *** indicate significant at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-significance level, respectively. Time dummies are
included. Standard errors between brackets. In the third column entries (Ent) and exits (Ext) are included next to
the 469 observations of incumbents of the first two columns, in the fourth column exits are included and in the fifth
column entries are included. The supposed market share the quarter before entering (for entrants) or the quarter
in which they exit (for exiting banks) is 0.001. PC stands for a dummy variable which is 1 in the post liquidity crisis
period, 0 before.
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Table 7: Estimation results for the lags of advertising in the market share equation
Lag included 0 1 2 3 4
Coefficient  0.018  0.031**  0.034**  0.001 -0.003
(t-value)  (1.4)  (2.2)  (2.3)  (0.1)  (0.2)
Note: *,** and *** indicate significant at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-significance level, respectively. The model is
identical to the first column of Table 6 with log(1+A(-1)+A(-2)) substituted by log(1+A), which is denoted by lag 0,
log(1+A(-1)), denoted by lag 1, up till log(1+A(-4)), denoted by lag 4. For each of the regressions we require that
data on A through A(-4) are available. This requirement reduces the number of observations to 342.
Table 8: Strategies, age, market share and financial resources
Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4
Interest rate High Low High Low
Advertising High High Low Low
N 128 156 169 117
Share 0.026 0.038 0.009 0.016
Top8 26.6% 44.2% 4.1% 17.1%
Licency date 92.8 91.8 93.2 92.1
Note: When the interest rate is above the (unweighted) average of the interest rate within each quarter then the
stragey is called a “high” interest rate strategy otherwise it is called a “low” interest rate strategy. When the
amount of advertising is below the median amount of advertising for the entire period (33) then the strategy is
called a “high” advertising strategy otherwise it is called a “low” advertising strategy. N is the number of
observations for which a certain strategy is found. ‘Share’, ‘TOP8’ and ‘Licency date’ are the average market
share, percentage of TOP8 (high assets) firms and the average licency date for the observations assigned to
each of the four strategy groups. Data from 1994.II on are included in this table. For the Sber-Bank a licency date
of 1980 is chosen, although the bank was founded shortly after the Russian Revolution.
Table 9: Probability of exit for the four strategy groups
strategy 1 2 3 4
probability of exit from strategy 0.05 0.12 0.60 0.23
Note: for each exit the last strategy observed is used to assign the exit to a certain strategy.
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Table 10: Summary statistics for the period 1994.II to 1997.II
Quarter Average rate N Average rate GKO yield CPI EXR
TOP8-banks    quarterly rates
94.II 113.64 50 101.67 209 29.0  18.3
94.III  83.30 57  76.43 115 19.4  12.4
94.IV  65.27 56  59.30  97 30.0  49.3
95.I  83.98 59  76.30 266 57.3  31.6
95.II 111.23 62 103.50 232 31.2  26.7
95.III  96.61 59  89.50 104 21.3 -13.4
95.IV  77.78 51  75.09 165 14.4   1.3
96.I  74.63 51  68.82 152 12.3   5.1
96.II  65.53 45  62.55  80  8.0   4.4
96.III  62.62 39  63.18 157  3.6   5.0
96.IV  49.77 31  50.18  69  1.3   5.0
97.I  35.55 29  35.91  44  5.7   3.3
97.II  25.43 30  25.73  30  4.0   2.0
Mean  72.72 47.6  67.59 132.3 18.3  11.6
Note: The average interest rate is in % per annum for all N banks and for the TOP8-banks. GKO yield is on the
secondary market one quarter lagged. GKO yield is % per annum. The change in Consumer Price Index CPI and
Exchange Rate EXR (versus the US dollar) are % per quarter (also one quarter lagged). The GKO, CPI and EXR
data are compiled from the Russian Economic Trends data source, SITE.
Table 11: Estimation results for the extents of competition throughout the period 1994-97
Quarter tqˆ tˆˆ qs tn tt / bg
94.II  0.0013 0.0005 39  0.00
94.III  0.0068 0.0004 46  0.03
94.IV  0.0051 0.0006 47  0.02
95.I -0.0142 0.0012 48 [-0.01]
95.II -0.0015 0.0004 53 [-0.00]
95.III  0.0088 0.0003 53  0.17
95.IV -0.0025 0.0008 46 [-0.00]
96.I -0.0015 0.0008 45 [-0.00]
96.II  0.0088 0.0006 43  0.06
96.III -0.0092 0.0015 36 [-0.01]
96.IV  0.0101 0.0013 30  0.05
97.I  0.0134 0.0017 29  0.10
97.II  0.0134 0.0027 30  0.11
Mean  0.0030 41.9  
Note: The first part of the table presents the least squares estimation results of the tq  for all the firms which have
the necessary data available. The implied values of  tt / bg  are given in the last columns. Estimates for the
effects of the factors of attraction and the R2 are given in Table 12. The total number of observations is 545.
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Table 12: Estimation results of the factors of attractiveness and the R2
ln(1+A(-1)) SHARE(-1) LIC TOP8 R2
jw  0.028  0.855 -0.059 -0.031 0.888
 (4.4)  (3.1)  (6.2)  (1.3)
Note: The table gives the estimates for the effect  ( jw ) of the factors of attraction and the R
2 for equation (14). T-
values between brackets. The total number of observations is 545.
Figure 1: Possible strategies for saving banks
Low share
or young Inclination towards
High Interest Rates
Possibility of an
High assets Advertising Strategy
Inclination towards
High share Low Interest Rates
or old
Strategy
Low share
or young Inclination towards
High Interest Rates
Low assets No Possibility of an
Advertising Strategy
Inclination towards
High share Low Interest Rates
or old
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT
REPORT SERIES
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT
Publications in the Report Series Research*  in Management
Impact of the Employee Communication and Perceived External Prestige on Organizational Identification
Ale Smidts, Cees B.M. van Riel & Ad Th.H. Pruyn
ERS-2000-01-MKT
Critical Complexities, from marginal paradigms to learning networks
Slawomir Magala
ERS-2000-02-ORG
Forecasting Market Shares from Models for Sales
Dennis Fok & Philip Hans Franses
ERS-2000-03-MKT
A Greedy Heuristic for a Three-Level Multi-Period Single-Sourcing Problem
H. Edwin Romeijn & Dolores Romero Morales
ERS-2000-04-LIS
Integer Constraints for Train Series Connections
Rob A. Zuidwijk & Leo G. Kroon
ERS-2000-05-LIS
Competitive Exception Learning Using Fuzzy Frequency Distribution
W-M. van den Bergh & J. van den Berg
ERS-2000-06-LIS
Start-Up Capital: Differences Between Male and Female Entrepreneurs, ‘Does Gender Matter?’
Ingrid Verheul & Roy Thurik
ERS-2000-07-STR
The Effect of Relational Constructs on Relationship Performance: Does Duration Matter?
Peter C. Verhoef, Philip Hans Franses & Janny C. Hoekstra
ERS-2000-08-MKT
Marketing Cooperatives and Financial Structure: a Transaction Costs Economics Analysis
George W.J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman
ERS-2000-09-ORG
                                                                
*  ERIM Research Programs:
LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems
ORG Organizing for Performance
MKT Decision Making in Marketing Management
F&A Financial Decision Making and Accounting
STR Strategic Renewal and the Dynamics of Firms, Networks and Industries
A Marketing Co-operative as a System of Attributes: A case study of VTN/The Greenery International BV,
Jos Bijman, George Hendrikse & Cees Veerman
ERS-2000-10-ORG
Evaluating Style Analysis
Frans A. De Roon, Theo E. Nijman & Jenke R. Ter Horst
ERS-2000-11-F&A
From Skews to a Skewed-t: Modelling option-implied returns by a skewed Student-t
Cyriel de Jong & Ronald Huisman
ERS-2000-12-F&A
Marketing Co-operatives: An Incomplete Contracting Perspective
George W.J. Hendrikse & Cees P. Veerman
ERS-2000-13– ORG
Models and Algorithms for Integration of Vehicle and Crew Scheduling
Richard Freling, Dennis Huisman & Albert P.M. Wagelmans
ERS-2000-14-LIS
Ownership Structure in Agrifood Chains: The Marketing Cooperative
George W.J. Hendrikse & W.J.J. (Jos) Bijman
ERS-2000-15-ORG
Managing Knowledge in a Distributed Decision Making Context: The Way Forward for Decision Support Systems
Sajda Qureshi & Vlatka Hlupic
ERS-2000-16-LIS
Organizational Change and Vested Interests
George W.J. Hendrikse
ERS-2000-17-ORG
Strategies, Uncertainty and Performance of Small Business Startups
Marco van Gelderen, Michael Frese & Roy Thurik
ERS-2000-18-STR
Creation of Managerial Capabilities through Managerial Knowledge Integration: a Competence-Based Perspective
Frans A.J. van den Bosch & Raymond van Wijk
ERS-2000-19-STR
Adaptiveness in Virtual Teams: Organisational Challenges and Research Direction
Sajda Qureshi & Doug Vogel
ERS-2000-20-LIS
Currency Hedging for International Stock Portfolios: A General Approach
Frans A. de Roon, Theo E. Nijman & Bas J.M. Werker
ERS-2000-21-F&A
Transition Processes towards Internal Networks: Differential Paces of Change and Effects on Knowledge Flows at
Rabobank Group
Raymond A. van Wijk & Frans A.J. van den Bosch
ERS-2000-22-STR
Assessment of Sustainable Development: a Novel Approach using Fuzzy Set Theory
A.M.G. Cornelissen, J. van den Berg, W.J. Koops, M. Grossman & H.M.J. Udo
ERS-2000-23-LIS
Creating the N-Form Corporation as a Managerial Competence
Raymond vanWijk & Frans A.J. van den Bosch
ERS-2000-24-STR
